A quantum digital signature is the quantum cryptographic primitives that combine classical digital signature and quantum mechanics to provide unconditional security for the identity of the sender and the integrity of the classical messages. Currently, lots of quantum digital signature schemes have been investigated. In this paper, we propose a new quantum digital signature scheme based on finite automata and show its security against existing attacks. Finally, the noteworthy features like no entangled states are indicated.
Introduction
Digital signatures are the widely used cryptographic primitives in the modern cryptography which ensure the authenticity of both classical messages and its sender involved in electronic communication. Most existing digital signature schemes were proposed based on the public-key cryptography such as RSA algorithm or elliptic curves algorithm which may be vulnerable in the quantum computer setting.
A quantum digital signature (QDS) combines the classical digital signature and quantum mechanics. It sufficiently takes advantage of quantum effects to provide unconditional security for the identity of the sender and the integrity of the classical messages.
The first QDS scheme was proposed by Gottesman and Chuang in 2001 [1] , which allows a signer to sign a message in such a way that the signature can be validated by a number of different people, and all will agree either that the message came from the signer or that it has been tampered with.
In 2002, Zeng and Keitel proposed a pioneering arbitrated QDS scheme [2] , which can be used to sign both a classical message and a quantum one. This work gave an elementary model to sign a quantum message. In the following year, many QDS schemes have been put forward [3, 4, 5, 6] . This paper investigated a new QDS scheme based on finite automata and showed its security against the existing attacks.
Finite automaton public key cryptosystem (FAPKC), first proposed by Tao and Chen in 1985 [7] , is a public key cryptosystem based on the invertibility theory of finite automaton. It's security rests on the difficulties of inversion of nonlinear finite automata and of factoring matrix polynomials over a finite field GF(q), where q is a prime number. Unlike block cipher based public key cryptosystem, FAPKC is sequential in nature. Two most important versions of FAPKC include FAPKC3 [8] and FAPKC4 [9] .
In general, both FAPKC3and FAPKC4 have advantages such as  Easy to implement since only logical operations are involved;  Computation is relatively fast;  Data expansion ratio almost approaches 0;  The size of user's public key is rather smaller;  To the best of our knowledge, FAPKC3 and FAPKC4 are still secure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, some key concepts of finite automaton are introduced, and then the quantum digital signature scheme based on finite automata is described in detail. After that, the security analyses against existing attacks and feasibility analyses for the scheme are also given. Finally, we summarize this paper.
Finite Automaton
In this section, we briefly recall some basic definitions of finite automaton.
A finite automaton M is a quintuple 〈X, Y, S, δ, λ〉, where X, Y and S are nonempty finite sets (called the input alphabet, the output alphabet and the state alphabet of M, respectively), δ: S×X → S is a single-valued mapping (called the next state function of M), and λ: S×X → Y is a single-valued mapping (called the output function of M).
The domains of δ and λ can be expanded to the sequences of X as follows. For any state s 0 in S and any l (a positive integer) input letters x 0 , x 1 , …, x l-1 in X, we can obtain the states s 1 , …, s l in S and output letters y 0 , y 1 , …, y l-1 in Y recurrently by
(2) Similarly, for any state s 0 in S and any infinite input sequence x 0 x 1 …, the infinite output sequence can be defined as follows. 
Here, M f is called the (h, k)-order memory finite automaton determined by f. In the case of k = 0, M f is also called the h-order input-memory finite automaton determined by f.
Let g: U r ×V p+1 U , and f: W t+1 V be single-valued mappings, where r, p, t are all nonnegative integers, then the compound finite automaton C'
memory finite automaton defined by
More conceptions about finite automata not stated here can be found in [10] .
Quantum Digital Signature Scheme
In this section, we describe quantum digital signature scheme based on finite automata as follows.
Key Generation Algorithm
A signer can generate the public key and secret key as follows.
(1) Chooses a positive number m, and let both the alphabets X and Y be the same m-dimensional column vector space over GF (2) .
( , and M 1 * can be expressed as a series of matrices over GF (2) , and the states s 0,v , s 1,v , s 0,s , and s 1,s can also be expressed as a series of vectors over GF (2) . By converting matrices and vectors into quantum forms, we can obtain the corresponding quantum form of the finite automata. 
Signature Algorithm
If a signer wants to sign a message |y 0 〉|y 1 〉…|y n 〉 (i.e., a quantum string), he can do the following:
(1) Randomly chooses τ 0 + τ 1 quantum digits |y n+1 〉|y n+2 〉…|y n+τ 0 +τ 1 〉.
(2) Using M 0 * , s 0,s and |x 0 〉 to compute |x' 0 〉 via the following:
|x' −1 〉...|x' −h 0 〉|y τ 0 〉…|y 0 〉|y −1 〉…|y −k 0 〉|0〉 → |x' −1 〉...|x' −h 0 〉|y τ 0 〉…|y 0 〉|y −1 〉…|y −k 0 〉|x' 0 〉 (3) Repeats step (2) n + τ 0 + τ 1 times until the signer obtains |x' 1 〉, |x' 2 〉, …, |x' n+τ 0 +τ 1 〉 via the following:
Obtains the quantum string |x' 0 〉|x' 1 〉…|x' n+τ 0 +τ 1 〉. (5) Using M 1 * , s 1,s and |x' 0 〉 to compute |x 0 〉 via the following:
Repeats step (5) n + τ 0 + τ 1 times until |x 1 〉, |x 2 〉, …, |x n+τ 0 +τ 1 〉 are obtained via the following:
Obtains the quantum string |x 0 〉|x 1 〉…|x n+τ 0 +τ 1 〉, i.e., the signature of the message.
Verification Algorithm
After receiving the quantum signature |x 0 〉|x 1 〉…|x n+τ 0 +τ 1 〉 from the signer, a verifier can verify the signature by taking the following steps:
(1) Obtains signer's quantum form public key 
Security Analysis
Here, we provide feasibility analysis and security analysis of our quantum digital signature scheme.
Correctness
Similar to the proof of Theorem 6 in [8] , we can get the conclusion: Let M 0 , M 0 * , M 1 , M 1 * be the memory automata which satisfy the conditions in key generation algorithm, C'(M 1 , M 0 ) be the compound finite automaton, and s 0,v , s 1,v , s 0,s , s 1,s be the states generated in key generation algorithm. For any |x 0 〉, |x 1 〉, … in X and |y 0 〉, |y 1 〉, … in Y, if |x 0 〉|x 1 〉… = λ 1 * (s 1,s , λ 0 * (s 0,s , |y 0 〉|y 1 〉…)), then we have that λ(〈 |y −1,s 〉, …, |y −k 0 ,s 〉, |x τ 0 +τ 1 −1 〉, …, |x 0 〉, |x −1,s 〉, …, |x τ+τ 1 −h 1 −h 0 ,s 〉 〉, | x τ 0 +τ 1 〉| x τ 0 +τ 1 +1 〉…) = |y 0 〉|y 1 〉…. Hence, if a singer signs a message using his private key, verifier can verify the signature using signer's public key.
Unforgeability
Suppose that an attacker tries to forge a signer's signature, there are several methods the attacker may take.
(1) Direct construction. The attacker tries to construct a signature of the message directly. Since no statistical association between the message and the signature exists, there is no way for the attacker to construct the corresponding signature from a given message.
(2) Computing weak inverse of weak invertible finite automata. The attacker can get a signer's public key (C'(M 1 , M 0 ), s 0,v , s 1,v , τ 0 + τ 1 ). If he can find a finite automaton M * which is a weak inverse of C'(M 1 , M 0 ) with delay τ 0 + τ 1 , he can compute the signature from the message.
A general method to compute the weak inverses of a weakly invertible automaton was introduced in [10] (see pp.32-33). However, using this method to forge the signature is impractical for the moderate τ 0 + τ 1 .
To seek alternative methods to get the signature, the attacker may take divide and conquer strategy, that is, he feasibly finds finite automata M ' 1 , M ' 0 so that C'(M ' 1 , M ' 0 ) = C'(M 1 , M 0 ) and construct the weak inverse finite automata of M ' 1 and M ' 0 , respectively. Thus a weak inverse finite automata of C'(M 1 , M 0 ) is obtained accordingly. However, this method is also impractical based on the results in [11] , if the state space of the weakly invertible finite automata is large.
(3) Known signature attack. Suppose that the attacker get signer's public key (C'(M 1 , M 0 ), s 0,v , s 1,v , τ 0 + τ 1 ). He can verify any signature |x 0 〉|x 1 〉…|x n+2τ0+2τ1 〉 and obtain corresponding message |y 0 〉|y 1 〉…|y n+τ0+τ1 〉 by using the compound finite automaton C'(M 1 , M 0 ) and verifying state s 0,v , s 1,v . Hence, the attacker may simulate the process of signature algorithm.
Assume that the output quantum string of M 0 * is |x' 0 〉|x' 1 〉…|x' n+τ0+τ1 〉, if the input quantum string of M 0 * is |y 0 〉|y 1 〉…|y n+τ 0 +τ 1 〉. From Similarly, for weakly invertible finite automaton M 1 * , the output quantum string is |x 0 〉|x 1 〉…|x n+2τ0+2τ1 〉, if the input quantum string is |x' 0 〉|x' 1 〉…|x' n+τ0+τ1 〉. From
the attacker can also get a series of equations.
Therefore, the problem of reconstruct the automata M 0 * and M 1 * can be reduced to the problem of solving a nonlinear system of equations. If the attacker can solve those equations, he can reconstruct the automata M 0 * and M 1 * . However, the system of equations is nonlinear in essential, and the number of variables is large, which means that it seems difficult to solve such system of equations.
(4) Exhausting search attack. Since the verification algorithm is known for anyone, the attacker may guess all the possible signatures and verify them individually. Suppose that the attacker get signer's public key (C'(M 1 , M 0 ), s 0,v , s 1,v , τ 0 + τ 1 ) and want to forge the signature of a message |y 0 〉|y 1 〉…|y n 〉. He guesses a possible signature and verifies it. If the verifying result is correct, then the guessed signature is the virtual one.
In fact, the guess process can be reduced to guessing a piece of signature of length τ 0 + τ 1 + 1 and deciding whether its first digit is correct or not. The guess process can be described as follows.
 The attacker guesses a value of |x 0 〉|x 1 〉…|x τ 0 +τ 1 +1 〉 of the signature, verifies it using the signer's public key, and compares the result with |y 0 〉|y 1 〉…|y τ 0 +τ 1 +1 〉 of the message. If they coincide, then the first digit of the guessed signature, |x 0 〉, is indeed the first digit of the virtual signature.
Repeat the same process until all the digits of the signature are obtained. The above exhaustive search attack is a deterministic algorithm. For the moderate τ 0 + τ 1 , this method is impractical (the proof is similar to the proof in [10, pp 368-370]).
(5) Stochastic search attack. The exhaustive search attack can be modified to a stochastic one. For the moderate τ 0 + τ 1 , this method is also impractical (the proof is similar to the proof in [10, pp 371-372]).
Summary
In this paper, we presented a new quantum digital signature scheme based on finite automata, which is at least as secure as classical digital signature scheme based on finite automata. In practice, the finite automata used in our scheme is (h, k)-order memory finite automata, and its output function λ can be implemented only by logical operations which means that it is easy to implement by a quantum circuit. Further, there is no entangled state and complex quantum operation needed at all in our scheme.
